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THE MERCANTILE AGENCY AND CONDITIONAL
PRIVILEGE IN DEFAMATION
INTRODUCTION
A necessary incident to the development of our economy into the
complex and flexible system that exists today has been a tremendous
expansion in the use of credit at all levels of the economic process.
Even the most cursory examination of credit statistics will indicate
at once an impressive increase in the volume of credit that can be
traced through all the stages of production and distribution. A busi-
nessman's credit is a good indication of his prospects for success.
Hence, a strong credit standing is an asset of great value in our
present commercial world. On the other hand, the disadvantages
accruing to the poor credit risk have been equally multiplied, and one
whose credit has received an unwarranted smear has suffered a
grievous wrong. Accompanying the expansion in the use of credit
has been the rise of private enterprises known as mercantile agencies1
which operate to supply to those subscribing to their services in-
formation bearing on the credit standing of others in return for a
consideration. A person, firm, or corporation is sometimes faced with
an impaired credit standing and damaged reputation as the result
of an erroneous credit report that has been issued by one of these
agencies. An action for libel may then be brought against the mercan-
tile agency to recover the consequent damages. As an affirmative de-
fense to the plaintiff's action, the agency may claim the benefit of
conditional privilege. The purpose of this discussion is to explore
briefly the effects of permitting the agency to have the advantage of
this defense and to inquire into its appropriateness in such an action
in view of the law of privileged defamation.
BACKGROUND
Before considering specifically the problem of conditional privilege
as applied to the mercantile agency, it is well to examine briefly the
broad aspects of privilege and the pertinent considerations which de-
termine the applicability of privilege to a given set of facts. It has
1. For the purposes of this discussion the following definition of "mercantile
agency" is adopted: "Mercantile agencies are establishments which make a busi-
ness of collecting information relating to the credit, character, responsibility,
general reputation, and other matters affecting persons, firms, and corporations
engaged in business, and furnishing the information to subscribers for a con-
sideration." 36 Am. JUR., Mercantile Agencies § 2 (1941).
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been said that the idea of unreasonable interference with the interest of
others is the "common thread woven into all torts."2 In defamation,
as in other areas of tort law, the search for a standard of reason-
ableness is guided by primary considerations of social policy toward
a desirable balance between the interest the plaintiff seeks to protect
and the defendant's freedom of action. As stated by Professor Harper
in an article on privileged defamation:
The whole of tort law may be envisaged as a process for the
protection of one man's interest at the expense of another's ac-
cording to a norm of social policy. In the law of defamation, as
elsewhere, we find a continuous comparison of the social value
of the interests involved and the probable effect thereon of
license or restraint upon statement and discussion. Immunity
is granted or withheld on the principle of the residium of social
convenience deriving from the protection of one interest at the
expense of another.3
Recognizing the importance of reputation and its peculiar suscep-
tibility to damage, the courts have developed unusually stringent
principles for its protection. During the process of this development,
malice as a prerequisite to liability has been reduced to an almost
meaningless term. The necessity of malice in defamation was in-
corporated in the common law at an early date, apparently derived
from the canon law requirement of malitia.4 The requirement was
the existence of malice in its actual or literal sense, i. e., malevolent
motive.5 However, it was deemed desirable by the courts to grant
relief in cases where the plaintiff had been defamed despite the fact
that no such malevolent motive could be shown. To accomplish this,
the fiction of implied malice or malice in law was developed 6 so that
all that is now necessary to create liability for defamation is an un-
privileged communication for false and defamatory matter of and
concerning the plaintiff which is actionable per se, or if not so action-
able, is the cause of special damage.7 Malice is then presumed to
exist from the publication of the words,8 and the defendant may
be held to account for damage to the plaintiff's reputation without any
proof that he intended the consequences or that he was negligent with
2. PROSsEa, TORTS § 1 (2d ed. 1955).
3. Harper, Privileged Defamation, 22 VA. L. REv. 642 (1936).
4. See Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 CoLum. L.
REv. 33, 35 (1904).
5. See Note, 25 MINx. L. REv. 495, 496 (1941).
6. Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247, 1 C. & P. 475, 673 (1825).
7. 53 C. J. S. Libel and Slander § 1 (1948).
8. Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S. C. 490, 38 S. E. 2d 641 (1946) ; Smith
v. Youmans, 3 Hill 85 (S. C. 1836).
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1959], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss2/8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QuARTZRLY
respect to them.9 The reason for this strict liability may be said to
be that society considers the interest of an individual in his reputation
so valuable that it demands protection even against innocent invasions.
As a result, an interference even without "fault" becomes an un-
reasonable interference in the eyes of the law.
The general rule of strict liability, however, could not be applied
uncompromisingly to all situations without working substantial hard-
ship. Consequently, exceptions have been created in which the oc-
casion is considered of such importance that liability for defamation
arising out of and within the scope of the occasion is dispensed with
or alleviated. If the defendant can bring himself within one of these
occasions the defamatory publication is then said to be privileged.
Implicit in the idea of privileged defamation is a shift in the balance
of interests. If the privilege is to be granted, the social value of the
interest sought to be protected by the privilege must have greater
weight than the interest of the defamed in obtaining compensation
for his damaged reputation. Hence, the propriety of granting or with-
holding the privilege is patently dependent upon public policy.1 0
Privileged communications are divided into two classes: 1) those
which are absolutely privileged, and 2) those which are conditionally
or qualifiedly privileged. In situations in which an absolute privilege
exists, the law regards the occasion of such importance that no action
will lie in libel or slander regardless of the circumstances under which
the defamatory matter was published."' Absolute privilege has been
limited generally to legislative and judicial proceedings, matters in-
volving military affairs, and communications made in the discharge
of a duty under express authority of law by or to heads of executive
departments of the state.12 .
The greater number of privileged communications are conditionally
privileged. The conditional privilege is applied to those occasions
which are of sufficient importance to require protection from liability
where the conduct of the defendant is not culpable but which are not
of such importance as to require the complete immunity from. liability
afforded by the absolute privilege. If the defendant can show that the
9. Corrigan v. Bobbs Merrill Co., 228 N. Y. 58, 126 N. B. 260, 10 A. L. R.
662 (1920); PRossm, TORTS § 94 (2d ed. 1955); RtSTATEMENT, TORTS §§
579, 580 (1938).
10. Macintosh v. Dun, [1908] A. C. 390 (P. C.) (the general interest of
society) ; HARPER AND JAurAs, TORTS § 5.21 (1956).
11. Johnson v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 959
(E. D. S. C. 1951); Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S. C. 490, 38 S. R. 2d
641 (1946) (dictum).
12. See Johnson v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 959
(R. D. S. C. 1951), Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S. W. 878 (1910).
[Vol. I11
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defamatory matter was published on a conditionally privileged oc-
casion, the malice implied by law from the publication is rebutted,
and the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was
actuated by malice as a matter of fact.' 3 The privilege may be abused
by the manner of its exercise and the protection lost.14 Unnecessary
defamation and publication are not protected.' 5
It is impossible to enumerate the particular instances in which
conditional privilege will apply. Each fact situation must be considered
in the light of the interests involved and the effects arising from
granting or withholding the privilege. As an all inclusive rule it has
been said that the communication is privileged when it is "fairly made
by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether
legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where
his interest is concerned.' 61 When applied to specific situations,
the types of private interest receiving protection can be classified as
follows: 1) interest of the publisher, 2) common interest of the
publisher and the recipient of the information, and 3) interest of
the recipient or a third person.' 7 The question of privilege for a
mercantile agency in publishing credit reports is most properly ana-
lyzed by considering the interest of the recipient of the credit report
as the protected interest.ls
CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE AS A DEFENSE VOR MERCANTILE
AGINCIMS
In most jurisdictions, the defense of conditional privilege is avail-
able to a mercantile agency when the defamatory matter has been
published confidentially and in good faith to a subscriber who is
interested in the information.' 9 When malice can be shown to exist
the privilege is, of course, defeated.2 0 The privilege will also be lost
if the mercantile agency goes beyond the scope of the occasion by
circulating the defamatory report to its subscribers generally without
13. Fitchette v. Sumter Hardwood Co., 145 S. C. 53, 142 S. E. 828 (1925).
14. Rowell v. Johnson, 170 S. C. 205, 170 S. E. 151 (1932).
15. Pollasky v. Minchener, 81 Mich. 280, 46 N. W. 5 (1890); Fulton v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 220 S. C. 287, 67 S. E. 2d 425 (1951).
16. Baron Parke in Toogood v. Spyring, 1 C. M. & R. 181, 3 L. J. Ex. 181
(1834).
17. PROMR, TORTs § 95 (2d ed. 1955).
18. See Smith, Conditional Prizilege for Mercantile Agencies - Macintosh v.
Dun, 14 CoLum. L. Rrv. 187,296, 304-05 (1914).
19. Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, Inc., 194 V. 2d 160 (D. C. Cir.),
30 A. L. R. 2d 772, cert. denied 344 U. S. 821, rehearing denied 345 U. S. 960
(1952); Erber & Stickler v. R. G. Dun & Co., 12 Fed. 526 (C. C. E. D. Ark.
1882); Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N. Y. 477 (1868).
20. Hooper-Holmes Bureau v. Bunn, 161 F. 2d 102 (5th Cir. 1947); Minter
v. Bradstreet Co., 174 Mo. 444, 73 S. W. 668 (1903).
1959]
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regard to their interest in the information contained therein. 2 ' The
South Carolina Supreme Court, in the recent case of Cullum v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc.,22 followed this majority rule and denied recovery
to the plaintiff on his inability to introduce sufficient evidence of actual
malice, the report having been issued to an interested subscriber upon
request. In direct opposition to this view are the few courts which
have refused to grant mercantile agencies a privilege under any
circumstances.23 Though there is an unmistakable tendency to adhere
to the general rule and allow mercantile agencies to assert the de-
fense of conditional privilege, much can be said in support of the
view that the privilege should be denied.
The primary justification for granting the privilege has been a
recognition of the usefulness of these establishments in facilitating
commercial transactions by providing to businessmen an easy access
to information concerning the credit and financial standing of others
with whom they may wish to deal, thus protecting them from poor
credit risks.2 4 That the service performed by the mercantile agency
is useful and that the interest of the recipient of the information is
a legitimate one are both propositions that are unassailable. Neverthe-
less, with the conflicting interest of the defamed in protecting his
business standing and his reputation at stake, it is questionable wheth-
er the mercantile agency, in its particular setting, should receive so
substantial a protection as is afforded by the conditional privilege.
The interest of a merchant or businessman in protecting himself
against dealing with a poor credit risk is of sufficient importance to
give rise to a privileged occasion should he inquire of another indi-
vidual concerning the character and standing of the contemplated
customer.2 5 It may also be stated as a general rule that communi-
cations between an agent and his principal related to the subject
matter of the agency are privileged.20 By an extension of the appli-
cation of these principles, communications by a mercantile agency
with its subscribers have been held to be privileged.2 7 It is reasonable
21. Hanschke v. Merchants Credit Bureau, 256 Mich. 272, 239 N. W. 318
(1931) ; King v. Patterson, 49 N. J. L. 417, 9 AtI. 705 (1887); Sunderlin v.
Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188 (1871).
22. 228 S. C. 384, 90 S. R. 2d 370 (1955), 9 S. C. L. Q. 291 (1957).
23. Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1836); Pacific Packing Co. v.
Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 Pac. 1007 (1914) ; Macintosh v. Dun, [19081
A. C. 390 (P. C.).
24. See the Note to Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 Fed. 214 (C. C. D. Md. 1882).
25. Melcher v. Beeler, 48 Colo. 233, 110 Pac. 181 (1910) ; Froslee v. Lund's
State Bank of Vining, 131 Minn. 435, 155 N. W. 619 (1915).
26. 53 C. J. S. Libel and Slander § 112 (1948).
27. Erber & Stickler v. R. G. Dun & Co., 12 Fed. 526 (C. C. R. D. Ark.
1882) ; Orrnsby v. Douglass, 37 N. Y. 477 (1868).
[Vol. 11
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that a merchant 'who may himself inquire of another merchant con-
cerning the credit standing of a third person may employ a private
agent to seek the same information. Privilege should then apply to
the communication by the agent to his principal. However, it does
not necessarily follow that this reasoning should apply to mercantile
agencies. An immediate objection to this analysis is the classification
of mercantile agencies as agents of the subscriber. It would seem more
proper to classify them as independent contractors. 2 s Degree of con-
trol is said to be the primary consideration in distinguishing between
an agent and an independent contractor. 2 9 The operation of these
establishments is completely detached from any degree of control by
the subscriber, either as to the means and methods of procuring the
information or as to the personnel. Of course, recognizing the status
of mercantile agencies as independent contractors, though it removes
the applicability of the ordinary rules of agency, does not settle the
question of whether or not they should be allowed to set up the de-
fense of conditional privilege in an action for libel. The question of
privilege centers around the desirability of protecting the particular
interest involved. Regardless of how the mercantile agency is classi-
fied, the interest which gives rise to the communication remains the
same, viz., the interest of the recipient of the information in pro-
tecting himself from poor credit risks. However, the difference in the
respective positions of an agent hired to obtain the desired infor-
mation and the mercantile agency is such that the justification for
granting the privilege to the former does not necessarily carry for-
ward to the latter. To illustrate this it is necessary to return to the
purpose of privilege in general.
It has been seen that privilege is granted as a matter of policy
when it is felt that there is an interest which is of such importance
that it requires some degree of protection even at the risk of un-
compensated harm to reputation. In conditional privilege the interests
to be protected are not of such paramount importance nor so well
defined as to remove from careful consideration the effects of the
privilege when employed in a particular fact situation. In weighing
the advantages of applying the privilege against the disadvantages,
there must necessarily be an examination of the possibility of injury
and probable extent of the injury should it result.30
28. See Smith, Conditional Privileqe for Mercantile Agencies - Macintosh v.
Dun, 14 COLUm. L. REv. 187, 204 (1914).
29. Note, Independent Contractor in South Carolina, 4 S. C. L. Q. 150, 152
(1951).
30. Harper, Privileged Defamation, 22 VA. L. Rtv. 642 (1936).
1959]
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The private agent may make a false and defamatory report to his
principal, but the resulting harm to the one defamed is not likely to
be of great proportions due to the limited publication. 3 ' If there is
in fact a malicious motive, the defamed is more likely to be aware
of facts which would indicate that the words were maliciously spoken.
The methods of investigation of mercantile agencies are in truth
more systematic and their operations are conducted on a large scale,
but this is not necessarily a guarantee of increased accuracy when it
is considered that the opportunity for internal errors is multiplied by
the necessity of channeling information through numerous employees.
Of some significance is the fact that the relationship between a firm
and its employees grows more impersonal with an increasing scope
of operations. Those who engage in the occupation of collecting in-
formation on others to be communicated to merchants for credit
purposes must have a keen awareness of the protential harm that
can result from anything less than a diligent and objective pursuit
of such information. Errors, when they are made, are likely to be
the result of some degree of carelessness from an investigation not
as thorough as it could have been, or from clerical error, or from
accepting false information from original sources as true.3 2 In
large organizations such as mercantile agencies, personnel becomes
a matter of business expediency and close supervision and examina-
tion of the work of employees may tend to be neglected.
When an erroneous report is given by a mercantile agency, what
are its possible effects? It must be recognized that credit reporting
agencies today enjoy some notoriety. Once information is gathered
concerning a particular firm or individual it is available to all who
are willing to pay the price to obtain it. Even though the agency may
disclaim any guaranty of accuracy in the contract with its subscriber,
the information will in all probability be taken as correct on its face
unless there is some reason for the subscriber to suspect an error.
The possibility then exists of sending forth inaccurate information to
a number of people personally interested in another's credit standing
31. In a concurring opinion in Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N. Y. 477 (1868),
holding conditional privilege available as a defense for a mercantile agency, it
is reasoned that an agent may act for several and therefore make the pursuit
of the information his occupation. The scope of the agent's publication could
be extended in this way. However, it is submitted that, as a practical matter,
the relation then would approach the situation of the mercantile agency and
the factors being considered would become progressively more important.
32. The dangers inherent in collecting information from strangers who may
have personal reasons to desire that the subject of the investigation be harmed
are emphasized in decisions denying mercantile agencies the protection of
privilege. See Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 Pac.
1007 (1914) ; Macintosh v. Dun, [1908] A. C. 390 (P. C.).
[Vol. 11
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who will act in reliance upon it. The harm that could result to the
person or firm reported on is obvious. The victim is indeed fortunate
if he discovers the reason for his plight. Should he be so fortunate,
he is faced with the task of proving that somewhere in the chain of
events leading from the original sources of information to its dis-
tribution to the subscriber, there has been actual malice at work.
33
What is generally involved in proving actual malice? Despite at-
tempts by the courts to define actual malice it is difficult to reach a
precise definition of the term. It has been succinctly stated to be the
presence of an improper motive34 and has been treated as being
equivalent to bad faith.3 5 It necessarily embraces ill will, 3 6 and may
also mean such a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of
another as is the equivalent of ill will.3 7 Publication of a defamatory
statement known by the publisher to be false is sufficient evidence
of actual malice.3 8 In South Carolina, a frequently cited test for
establishing actual malice is "that the defendant was actuated by ill
will in what he did and said, with a design to causelessly or wantonly
injure the plaintiff."3 9 This test indicates a malevolent state of mind.
Apparently, in seeking to recover from a mercantile agency, a plaintiff
may show such gross negligence as would warrant the inference that
such a state of mind exists, but anything short of this has not yet
been deemed sufficient. 4 0
It can be seen that the requirement that the plaintiff show the
existence of actual malice in the publication by a mercantile agency
of a false and defamatory report imposes upon the dafamed a tre-
mendous burden and may well amount to an insurmountable obstacle
to recovery. When it is recognized that actual malice as it is common-
ly used by the courts rarely exists to be proved, and to this is added
the practical difficulties of proving it against mercantile agencies,
there results a protection flowing from the conditional privilege that
borders on absolute immunity from liability in defamation.
33. See note 13, supra.
34. Warren v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 336 Mo. 184, 78 S. W. 2d 404 (1934).
35. H. E. Crawford Company v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F. 2d 387 (1957).
36. Minter v. Bradstreet, 174 Mo. 444, 73 S. W. 668 (1903).
37. Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 135 N. E. 515 (1922).
38. Froslee v. Lund's State Bank of Vining, 131 Minn. 435, 155 N. W. 619
(1915) ; Lawless v. Muller, 99 N. J. L. 9, 123 Atl. 104 (1923).
39. Cullum v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 228 S. C. 384, 90 S. E. 2d 370 (1955);
Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S. C. 490, 38 S. E. 2d 641 (1946) ; Duncan v.
Record Publishing Co., 145 S. C. 196, 143 S. E. 31 (1928). The test would
seem more adequately stated in terms of publishing the defamatory matter in
an improper manner or with improper and unjustified motives, or embracing
conduct which is in gross disregard of the plaintiff's rights. See Fulton v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 220 S. C. 287, 67 S. E. 2d 425 (1951).
40. See Cullum v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., supra note 39.
1959]
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The use of the word "protection" when referring to the mercantile
agency may be somewhat misleading because any protection from
liability which it may receive is afforded as a means of protecting
the interest of the subscriber which is the basis of the privilege. As
a practical matter, however, the protection from the privilege accrues
directly to the agency even if it is considered as merely incidental. The
acts which cause the harm are the acts of the agency, and the defamed
must look to the agency to recover damages when the reports are
defamatory. Hence, the degree of protection that is afforded to the
agency by reason of the privilege is of great importance in measuring
the difficulty imposed upon the defamed in obtaining redress. How-
ever, the salience of the protection which is received by the agency
has often tended to obscure the subscriber's interest. As a result, the
courts which have denied the privilege have laid great emphasis upon
the fact that mercantile agencies are in business for profit. There is,
of course, no legitimate purpose served by protecting them from
liability in order that they may be free to pursue their own motives of
self-interest. But since the ultimate purpose of the privilege is to
insure that the mercantile agencies will enjoy a sufficient freedom of
action to enable them to furnish credit information for the benefit
of their subscribers, objection to the privilege solely because there
is an element of profit involved seems unfounded. 41 If the interest
of the subscriber were sufficiently important and in fact furthered by
applying the privilege, and if this would override the effects upon the
interest of the person reported on, there would be no objection to
the agency's receiving compensation for its services. Nevertheless,
it cannot be said that the profit motive is wholly without significance.
Mercantile agencies hold themselves out to the public as a source of
credit information to be furnished for a price. This virtually places
the agencies in the position of volunteers in that requests for in-
formation are invited. Though the fact that defamatory information
is volunteered is not properly considered as controlling on the question
of privilege, yet, as stated in the case of Macintosh v. Dun:42 "[I] n
cases which are near the line, and in cases which give rise to a dif-
ference of opinion, the circumstance that the information is volun-
teered is an element for consideration certainly not without some
importance." Moreover, since the protection of the privilege does
fall upon the agency furthering the motive for personal gain, it would
41. For a criticism of the profit motive as a basis for denying the privilege
to mercantile agencies see Smith, Conditional Privilege for Mercantile Agencies
- Macintosh v. Dim, 14 CoxUm. L. Rtv. 187,296 (1914).
42. [1908] A. C. 390, 399 (P. C.).
[Vol. II
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seem that the need for applying the privilege ultimately to benefit
the subscribers should be compelling before it is granted. Though the
business of credit reporting is in no sense reprehensible, it is not of
such a nature that it should be singled out for protection by the
courts.
In view of the fact that the plaintiff's reputation and business
standing may suffer a devastating blow at the hands of a mercantile
agency as a result of the privilege, and recalling to mind the import-
ance to society and to the individual in prohibiting interferences of
this type, any substantial degree of doubt cast upon the effectiveness
of the privilege in accomplishing the end sought would seem sufficient
to justify its removal. On the other hand, mercantile agencies provide
the businessman with a valuable service. If removing the privilege
would have the effect of imposing such a hardship that their opera-
tions would be substantially impeded, this would speak strongly in
favor of retaining it.
It is felt that removing the privilege would stimulate an effort on
the part of these establishments to reduce the number of errors to
a minimum. Though all errors could not be eliminated even by the
most efficient mode of operation, the diminished risk could be further
alleviated by insurance.43 Consequently, the resulting hardship to the
mercantile agencies from refusing to apply conditional privilege to
their communications with their subscribers would not necessarily be
overpowering. Denying to the mercantile agency the benefit of the
privilege would not have a deleterious effect upon the subscriber's
interest, but would in fact be beneficial. The incentive to reduce claims
against the agency by increasing care in its investigations and in its
handling of the information, fostered by its greater susceptibility to
liability, would further the interest of the subscriber by providing a
greater assurance that the information imparted is accurate and re-
liable. In addition, the interest of those who are investigated would
be given not only a preventive protection but also a compensatory
protection. When all these factors are considered, the view that a
mercantile agency "should assume the responsibility for its acts,
and must be sure that it is peddling the truth"44 is very appealing.
PRILmEGE DEPENDENT UPON THaE EXERcIsE oF DuE CARm
The continued application of conditional privilege to communica-
tions by mercantile agencies with their subscribers indicates that the
courts have accepted the view that the occasion is one of some impor-
43. Suggested in 9 S. C. L. Q. 291,293 (1957).
44. Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 Pac. 1007 (1914).
09591
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1959], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss2/8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
tance to society. Withholding the privilege completely bears strongly
against the precedents in the United States which assume that the
protection of privilege is needed, although the need may be more
apparent than real. The difficulty lies in the fact that the protection
which has been granted through the medium of requiring actual
malice to be proved has brought tremendous disadvantages to the
defamed in addition to whatever advantages may be said to be derived
from it. The solution to the dilemma may then be appropriately di-
rected toward reducing these disadvantages without removing the
application of privilege entirely. This result is reached through making
the application of the privilege depend upon the absence of negligence.
An example of the use of negligence in this area may be found
in the early case of Douglass v. Daisley45 in which the defamation
resulted from an error occurring in the office of the mercantile agency
prior to communicating the information to its subscriber. The appli-
cation of privilege to a given occasion is a question of law.4 0 How-
ever, in this case, where the defamatory report was a substantial de-
parture from the information received from the investigator, it was
felt that the ultimate question of privilege could thereby become a
mixed question of law and fact. The Court stated that under such
circumstances the question would be whether the privilege was carried
to the communication through a reasonable and careful exercise of
the right or lost by indifferent and careless management, or through
inattention and want of due regard to the interest of others. The
Court went on to say:
If it was a pure mistake, involving no negligence or culpability
the privilege would not fail. On the other hand, if, by the exer-
cise of due care as men ordinarily exercise in like business af-
fairs, the true character of the information would have been dis-
covered and correct information sent out, rather than that which
was not warranted, then the privilege would fail.
The effect of this is to require a finding of fact that the mercantile
agency exercised due care in its office operations before the privilege
which would normally apply to the communication is made available
as a defense. The question of malice becomes of little importance be-
cause it is never reached if negligence is found. The decision, though
limited in its application, seems correct in its result. The agency is
45. 114 Fed. 628, on remand, 119 Fed. 485 (D. Mass. 1902). Contra, H. B.
Crawford Company v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc:, 241 F. 2d 387 (1957).
46. Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N. C. 106, 52 S. E. 249 (1905); Stewart v. Riley,
114 W. Va. 578, 172 S. E. 791 (1934); cf. Switzer v. American Ry. Express
Co., 119 S. C. 237, 112 S. E. 110, 26 A. L. R. 819 (1922).
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held responsible for making certain that its office operations are con-
ducted in a careful manner but is not required to pay for unavoidable
mistakes. When there is a variance between the information gathered
and the information communicated, the possibility of proving improp-
er motive or bad faith is almost nil. There is considerable justice in
requiring the mercantile agency to bear the loss when careless man-
agement results in harm to the plaintiff.
The idea that negligent conduct should defeat the protection of the
privilege is given clear expression by the American Law Institute in
its Restatement of the Law of Torts. The position is taken that if the
report by a mercantile agency is based upon a careful investigation
and made for the purpose of enabling a subscriber to determine the
advisability of extending credit to another 4 7 then it is privileged, but
if there is misinformation given which is the result of negligent in-
vestigation of the other's credit or of negligent communication to
the subscriber, the privilege is abused and the protection lost.48
Information concerning the existence of negligence on the part of
the mercantile agency would, however, be as inaccessible to the plain-
tiff as the information necessary to establish malice. Therefore, in
order for the plaintiff to receive any additional protection the burden
should be made to fall upon the mercantile agency to establish due
care. If this is done the privilege could be attached justifiably to
communications with interested subscribers. By applying the concept
of negligence in this manner, the various interests involved are well-
balanced. There is the benefit to subscribers of greater accuracy in
reports. The mercantile agencies are given sufficient freedom of action.
They are not subjected to liability unless there is some culpability on
their part in which event the discredited persons are given an oppor-
tunity for redress.
A distinction should be made between the theory of negligent con-
duct as sufficient grounds for denying to the defendant mercantile
agency the benefit of the defense of conditional privilege in an action
for libel, and the theory that the agency's liability be predicated solely
on negligence. As the law stands today, the person who is the subject
of a false credit report is not in a position to bring suit on the theory
of negligence. 4 9 Liability for negligent misstatement may exist under
47. It should be noted that the Restatement has abandoned the use of the
word "malice" in connection with conditional privilege. The privilege is abused
if one publishes false and defamatory matter not acting for the purpose of
protecting the particular interest for the protection of which the privilege is
given. RESTATZMENT, TORTS § 603 (1938).
48. RESTATZMENT, TORTS § 595 comment g (1938).
49. For an excellent discussion of this question see Note, Liability for Mis-
statements by Credit-Rating Agencies, 43 VA. L. Rvv. 561 (1957).
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some circumstances when the plaintiff has relied upon the false state-
ment to his damage,5 0 but it is limited to situations in which reliance
by the specific plaintiff is foreseeable. 5 ' The damage sustained by a
person who is the subject of a false credit report is not occasioned by
any reliance by him on the misinformation. It has been suggested that
liability in negligence could be justified on the reasoning that the
credit agency could foresee that the plaintiff would be harmed by a
misstatement in a credit report and there could then be an extension
of the duty to inform correctly beyond the contract with the sub-
scriber.5 2 The result would be similar to that reached by bringing a
suit for libel and defeating the defense of privilege by showing its
abuse through negligent conduct. In order to reach the conclusion that
the latter course is proper there must necessarily be a decision that
the mercantile agency owes to those whom it investigates a duty to
use ordinary care to avoid defaming them. However, when the report
is in fact defamatory5 3 the question of extending a duty of care is
not the problem. The problem is to overcome an exception to the
primary duty not to defame another by conduct which, under the
circumstances, is unreasonable. When this is done, the ultimate liabil-
ity rests on the breach of this primary duty. It does not then seem
as difficult to apply the standard of ordinary care as a prerequisite
to the availability of privilege to a mercantile agency. Moreover, when
the words are defamatory, the action for libel is the most appropriate
remedy. As a practical matter, the damage caused by defamatory
words, though it is very real, is nevertheless difficult to prove with
any degree of accuracy. The law takes this into account and presumes
some damage when the words are actionable per se which the plain-
tiff can recover without proof of actual damage.5 4 In contrast, there
So. See e. g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E:. 275, 23 A. L. R.
1425 (1922).
51. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, 74 A. L. R.
1139 (1931). See also Dale System, Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F
7 .
Supp. 745 (S. D. N. Y. 1952).
52. Note, Liability for Misstatements by Credit-Ratln Agencies, 43 VA. L.
Rxv. 561 (1957).
53. The words used in the reports may be defamatory in any number of ways.
Aside from imputations of insolvency or lack of credit, which when referring
to a merchant are libelous, Mitchell v. Bradstreet, 116 Mo. 226, 22 S. W. 358
(1893) ; Newell v. How, 31 Minn. 235, 17 N. W. 383 (1883), the words may
reflect directly upon the plaintiff's character. An example of the extent to which
the privilege may apply is found in Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency,
194 F. 2d 160 (D. C. Cir.), 30 A. L. R. 2d 772, cert. denied 344 U. S. 821, re-
hearing denied 345 U. S. 960 (1952) in which the report contained words im-
plying that the plaintiff was an unmarried mother. This was held to be within
the occasion since marital status and number of dependents bear on credit.
54. Barnett v. McClain, 153 Ark. 325, 240 S. W. 415 (1922); Walshe v.
Trenton Times, 124 N. J. L. 23, 10 A. 2d 740 (1940). See also Fitchette v.
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can be no liability on the theory of negligence without a showing of
actual damage proximately resulting from the defendant's act.5 5 The
possibility of recovery is, therefore, greatly limited.
The reluctance of the courts to adopt a course by which mercantile
agencies are held liable for defamation resulting from their care-
lessness is largely a result of an effort to protect the consistency of
the rules governing the defeasance of conditional privilege. In libel
actions, once the communication has been shown to be within the
scope of a privileged occasion, the cases speak in terms of establishing
the existence of malice or bad faith to overcome the privilege which
is applied as a matter of law if the facts permit. By following the
strict concept of malice it has been declared that ordinary negligence
has no bearing on this question.5 6 There are some jurisdictions,
however, which have gone beyond the usual motivational test and
have added a further requirement which involves considerations of
carelessness. In these jurisdictions, though the defendant may act in
good faith and believe the defamatory statement to be true, the de-
fense of privilege will not be available if there were no reasonable
grounds for such belief.57 The rule as stated by the Pennsylvania
court is that "[a] communication to be privileged must be made upon
a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon
Sumter Hardwood Co., 145 S. C. 53, 142 S. R. 828 (1925). For a discussion
of the question of damages in libel actions against mercantile agencies see the
Note, Tort Liability of Credit Investigating Agencies, 31 Txm,. L. Q. 50
(1957).
55. Ochs v. Public Service Ry. Co., 81 N. J. L. 661, 80 Atl. 495 (1911) ; 38
Amr. Jua., Negligqcnce § 28 (1941).
56. Mil-Hall Textile Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 778 (S. D.
N. Y. 1958); A. B. C. Needlecraft Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 245 F. 2d
775 (2d Cir. 1957). This position may be said to be strengthened by the com-
mon approach of treating the malice implied by law from the publication of the
defamation as a presumption which is overthrown by the privilege arising
from the occasion. It would seem to follow that if privilege is treated as a
rebuttal of the presumption of malice then defeating the privilege would require
malice to be shown and not negligence. However, from a realistic standpoint
this conclusion would appear to be a non sequitur since the use of malice in this
sense as a presumption is in fact fictitious. See Veeder, History and Theory of
the Law of Defamation, 4 CoLum. L. Ray. 33 (1904).
57. See e. g. Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N. H. 67, 121 Atl. 92 (1923) ; Tooth-
aker v. Conant, 91 Me. 438, 40 At]. 331 (1898); Stevenson v. Morris, 228 Pa.
405, 136 Atl. 234 (1927). See also RtsTArEmtxT, ToRTs § 601 (1938). For a
prolific treatment of this subject see Hallen, Character of Belief Necessary for
the Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 25 ILL. L. REv. 865 (1931). The
South Carolina Court has given some indication of approving this approach.
See the language in Switzer v. American Ry. Express Co., 119 S. C. 237, 112
S. R. 110, 26 A. L. R. 819 (1922) quoted on this point by way of dicta in
Moore v. New South Express Lines, 184 S. C. 266, 192 S. E. 261 (1937). In
the Swit7er case, which was concerned with the relative province of the court
and jury with respect to the defense of privilege, the Court in setting forth the
essential elements of fact entering into the defense included reasonable or
probable cause.
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reasonable or probable cause". 58 The application of this type of
analysis to mercantile agencies would be a great help in many in-
stances to one who has been defamed by a false credit report. 59 Under
this rule, the care taken in the investigation of the plaintiff's credit
becomes a question of primary concern. A mercantile agency could
not claim to have reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of its
report if it had not exercised proper diligence in collecting the in-
formation upon which the report is based.
It has been recognized that the requirement of reasonable grounds
for belief does not apply in all types of situations. Circumstances may
exist which justify the communication of information to another
which is based purely on rumor or hearsay. If there is a sufficiently
strong duty to impart the information, one who makes such a com-
munication stating that it is thus founded may be protected. 0 Mer-
cantile agencies, of course, deal largely in information that is acquired
from others and the subscribers who receive the reports are aware
of this. The agency does not place its personal credit behind the re-
ports. However, the relationship of these agencies with their sub-
scribers and the information which they convey would not seem to be
of the sort which would bar inquiry into their negligence. What
would seem to be the most preferable approach to the defense of
privilege calls into play all the pertinent circumstances which bear
on the reasonableness of the defendant's action in making the com-
munication. Lack of probable cause or reasonable grounds for belief
is a factor afforded whatever weight that the circumstances require.6o
Due to the nature of the business of credit reporting and the effects
upon those who are discredited previously considered, negligence on
the part of the agency which results in a defamatory report should be
looked upon as a sufficient basis for imposing liability.
Use of negligence to defeat the defense of privilege presents the
problem of reconciling the concept of due care with the requirement
of malice. Where the absence of probable cause or reasonable grounds
58. Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. 404, 2 Atl. 513 (1886). The Pennsylvania
Court lays the burden of establishing probable cause upon the defendant. See
Stevenson v. Morris, suptia note 57.
59. In the case of Locke v. Bradstreet, 22 Fed. 771 (C. C. D. Minn. 1885),
the Court defined the liability of the defendant mercantile agency with reference
to this doctrine, instructing the jury to find for the plaintiff if the defendant,
without exercising ordinary care and caution in collecting the information and
without reason to believe its truth, imparted the information to others recklessly.
In Douglass v. Daisley, supra note 45, the Court also analogized its position
with the probable cause doctrine.
60. Doane v. Grew, 220 Mass. 171, 107 N. E. 620 (1915); RESTAT mtNT,
TORTS § 602 (1938).
61. PRossER, TORTS § 95 (2d ed. 1955).
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for belief has been employed as a means of defeating the privilege,
it has been treated sometimes as an indication of malice or bad faith
though it is treated more often as a basis of liability even in the
absence of malice or bad faith. 62 Due care may thus be thought of
as an additional requirement for the defense of privilege or, in the
negative sense, the lack of due care may, under the circumstances,
be labeled malice. The former approach is perhaps more clear than
an attempt to incorporate negligence into malice. On the other hand,
there is good reason for loosening the construction of the word
"malice" to include conduct which should not be excused if the courts
are more inclined to stay within the limits of the term.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has thus far given no indi-
cation of imposing liability upon mercantile agencies where there is
only ordinary negligence involved. In Cullum v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc.,63 the Court was for the first time squarely confronted with the
task of determining the liability of a mercantile agency for issuing a
false credit report. The Court applied a conditional privilege to the
communication and then proceeded to determine the question of
malice. The report had been made as the result of information supplied
to the agency by a local correspondent. Before this correspondent
had been employed he had been approved by the defendant's super-
visor as a reliable person whose reports could be depended upon. The
plaintiff charged the agency with gross negligence in its selection of
this correspondent because he had on numerous occasions prior to
his employment forfeited bond in police court on charges of drunken-
ness. However, at the time he was investigated he had no police court
record of drunkenness for over a year. The Court quoted from Bell
v. Bank of Abbeville64 the definition of malice adopted in that case
which confines the term to ill will or improper motive. 6 5 It was then
held that the failure of the defendant to discover the previous record
was insufficient, of itself, to warrant the inference of negligence on
the part of the agency so gross as to amount to malice in employing
him. There was no evidence that the correspondent harbored any
feelings of ill will against the plaintiff. Nor was there any indication
that the agency acted with malicious motives in sending out the re-
port. There was, therefore, nothing to submit to the jury on the
question of malice in the sense that it was used by the Court and a
directed verdict for the mercantile agency was affirmed. In this case
62. See Hallen, Character of Belief Necessary for the Condition'al Privilege
in Defamation, 25 ILL L. R v. 865 (1931).
63. 228 S. C. 384, 90 S. E. 2d 370 (1955).
64. 208 S. C. 490,38 S. E. 2d 641 (1946).
65. See note 39 supra.
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the Court was presented with an opportunity to submit the question
of reasonable care to the jury for the purpose of defeating the pro-
tection of privilege but declined to do so. The approach taken by the
Court in accord with cases in other areas would have required the
defendant's negligence, if any, to be considered as an indication of
malice, and the Court did not accept a construction of the term which
would warrant this.
It is worthy of note that the facts in the Cullum case did not present
a very strong reason for imposing liability upon the agency for the
error committed. Whatever damage the plaintiff sustained as a re-
sult of the error was very slight. The report was issued to only two
subscribers who had requested credit information about the plaintiff.
One of these subscribers suspected an error and informed the plain-
tiff of the contents of the report. The plaintiff immediately had the
error corrected and the other report was retrieved before it was
opened. However, others who in the future may be affected by defama-
tory reports are not likely to be so fortunate.
It is not unrealistic to suppose that a situation may present itself
in which a person has been discredited with substantial injury result-
ing because of an error that is traceable to a want of care. At what
stage the carelessness occurs which ultimately results in the issuance
of the false report would seem of little importance. Supposing a
defamatory report to be issued which is founded upon a careless in-
vestigation or which results from negligence in handling the informa-
tion, would it be proper for the Court to allow the plaintiff a recovery
in the absence of ill will or improper motive? To answer this question
the further question is clearly presented whether it would be proper
to submit to the jury the issue of reasonable care as proof of the
necessary malice. As already indicated, this appears at first glance
to be contradictory. The contradiction, however, lies in definitions
which must be styled to embrace an entire field of conduct. If these
definitions are denied flexibility, they apparently exclude what the
policy underlying the term would seem to include. If the courts insist
upon the word "malice" as a requirement for defeating conditional
privilege, the scope of the word should be sufficiently broad to include
action on the part of the particular defendant which, under the cir-
cumstances, results in an unjust invasion of the plaintiff's rights.
In some cases, where the injury is one of potentially great proportions
and is avoidable by the exercise of reasonable care, it would seem
proper to say that the definitive gap between malice and negligence
[Vol. I1I
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is closed. 6 6 It must be remembered that reputation is inherently diffi-
cult to protect. The workings of defamatory words are insidious and
deadly. Even though there may in most instances be no reason to
equate want of due care with malice, where there is a private enter-
prise voluntarily dealing continuously in the reputation and financial
standing of others by subjecting them to the scrutiny of interested
subscribers, carelessness is essentially as blameworthy as a conscious
and purposeful wrongdoing. If this is so, there seems no reason to
be balked by verbal subtleties.
It may be said that this approach is fictitious. Even if this be con-
ceded, yet it is a useful fiction and not one that must be condemned.
6 7
Certainly, fictions are not strange to the law of defamation. In fact,
they are used so unsparingly in the imposition of liability that the
process by which the plaintiff's case is made out in the first instance
has been aptly described as a "beautiful and symmetrical fabric of
fiction". 6 8 An implication of malice from negligent conduct on the
part of a mercantile agency has at least as much support in reason
as the adopted fiction of implying malice from the publication of the
defamatory words with the consequent rebuttal of the privileged
occasion.
The South Carolina Court has recognized the unwisdom of re-
quiring proof of ill will or malignity in order to impose liability
where the words are prima facie privileged. 69 Conduct which is in
such gross disregard of the rights of the person injured as is equiva-
lent to malice has been approved as a proper criterion for imposing
liability.7 0 In the Cullumn case the Court intimated that gross negli-
gence could suffice to warrant a finding of malice. The Court, in
adopting negligence even of an extreme nature as an indication of
malice, has moved toward a merger of the opposing concepts of pur-
pose and lack of purpose and has introduced foreseeability of risk
66. With the factors approved by the courts as indicating malice found in
the text supported by notes 34-39 supra, should be compared the following
definition of malice appearing in the case of Jennings v. Clearwater, 171 S. C.
498, 503, 172 S. E. 870 (1934) involving malicious prosecution: "The term
malice as applied to torts, does not necessarily mean that which must proceed
from a spiteful, malignant or revengeful disposition, but a conduct injurious
to another, though proceeding from an ill-regulated mind not sufficiently cautious
before it occasions an injury to another."
67. It has been said that "fictions are, to a certain extent, simply the grow-
ing pains of the language of the law ... fiction, in the sense of a 'strained
use of old linguistic material,' is an inevitable accompaniment of progress in
the law itself . . . ." Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. Rev. 363, 379 (1930).
68. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
69. Fulton v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 220 S. C. 287, 67 S. E. 2d 425
(1951).
70. Ibid.
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as a pertinent consideration in the agency's liability. It is submitted
that the word "gross" preceding negligence is here an unnecessary
epithet.71 Action which does not satisfy the basic standard of reason-
able conduct under the circumstances, in the light of the obvious risk
in this area, is a sufficient indication in itself of a gross disregard of
the plaintiff's rights. The Court would be justified in finding that
an extreme departure from this standard is neither necessary nor
appropriate. By approaching the question in this manner, the case
could be submitted to the jury with less difficulty and the jurors
would have a greater latitude of judgment. Should the agency fail
to establish reasonable care in collecting and handling the information
as a basic foundation for its defense of privilege, an inference of
malice would arise and the agency could be found liable. With a
clarifying instruction in accordance with this principle to assure that
the jurors would not base the question of the agency's liability on
the limited meaning which malice connotes, they could be trusted to
reach.a just result. Ill will and spitefulness, if found to exist, would
support a finding of punitive damages. The extent of the publication
and the subsequent conduct of the agency including retractions and
corrections would be possible items in the defendant's favor on the
question of damage.
Ultimately, the imposition of liability upon mercantile agencies for
errors resulting from a want of care need not be justified solely upon
the construction of a word. If malice is taken in its strictest meaning
and removed entirely from consideration, there remains an unreason-
able exercise of the privilege when carelessness has caused the error.
Credit reporting agencies have the advantage of carrying on their
business within a privileged occasion, the right arising by reason
of an attempt to facilitate access to the information which they have
to offer. Even though this right is recognized to exist, it is hard to
escape the fairness of the Court's approach in the Daisley case when
it was said:
It being a business right, however, or a private right, to gather
and impart information to such members of the business world
as were its subscribers, it must exercise the right reasonably to
71. Negligence is in itself a relative term when applied to different sets
of circumstances. Bodie v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co., 61 S. C. 468, 39 S. E.
715 (1900). The use of degrees of negligence is a practice that is often criticized
as impracticable and unnecessarily confusing. See Steamboat New World v.
King, 57 U. S. (16 How) 469 (1853); PROSsrR, TORTS § 33 (2d ed. 1955).
See also Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113 (1843) in which Baron Rolfe con-
cludes that gross negligence is merely ordinary negligence "with the addition
of a vituperative epithet."
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the end that unnecessary harm shall not come to business men
about whom the information is furnished. It is not a right which
can be exercised heedlessly or carelessly.
7 2
It has been suggested that the true test for determining whether the
defense of privilege is available in a given case should always be
whether the defendant acted as a reasonable man under the circum-
stances.7 3 In the case of mercantile agencies, malice in its common
sense is normally not an active question. Since, unless there is an
unavoidable mistake, the question is most likely to be whether care-
lessness is to be protected, the propriety of invoking the aid of the
rule of reasonable care is particularly striking. Other businesses which
engage in useful activities are subject to liability for harm that re-
sults to others from their negligence. It is difficult to justify placing
mercantile agencies in a peculiarly advantageous position by holding
them responsible only when there is malice just because the item
they sell is information. In the final analysis, there is little justification
for consciously applying reasons of policy to determine the propriety
of affording privilege to a particular occasion and then disregarding
the possibility of reaching a more desirable result by fitting the
privilege to the exigencies of the occasion with due regard to the
effects upon the interests involved. The plaintiff's interest in these
cases demands more than protection from malicious conduct. Even
in view of the interest which gives rise to the privileged occasion it
would not appear necessary to relieve mercantile agencies from re-
sponsibility for their negligence. Hence, rather than feeling circum-
scribed by malice, the courts would be justified in disregarding it,
except when it is an actual element in the case, and directly centering
the question of the availability of the defense of privilege upon the
question of fact whether or not the agency exercised its right reason-
ably-with due care.
CONCLUSION
The mercantile agencies are engaged in a lawful and useful business
which serves a legitimate interest and promotes the convenience of
the commercial world. Their conduct as such is not to be proscribed
solely because there is an element of private gain involved in dealing
in the reputation of others. However, the individual interests affected
by their operations and the collective interest of society are not best
served by affording to these establishments the substantial protection
72. 114 Fed. 628, 631, on remand, 119 Fed. 485 (D. Mass. 1902).
73. PROSSER, TORTS § 95 (2d ed. 1955) ; Hallen, Character of Belief Necessary
for the Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 25 ILL. L. Riv. 865 (1931).
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resulting from conditional privilege requiring proof of bad faith or
improper motive when false and defamatory credit reports are issued
to interested subscribers. The rule that imposes this requirement in
a suit against a mercantile agency does not seem to carry with it
a sufficient benefit to the subscribers to justify the difficulty it creates
for the innocent third party to obtain redress for damage to his
reputation and business standing. There is substantial justification
for withholding the privilege completely and holding the agency
liable for its errors, however made. But rather than substitute one
extreme for another, there is the possibility of reaching a desirable
result by requiring the mercantile agency to operate its business and
collect information in a careful manner and imposing liability when
a failure to do so results in defamation. This seems the most readily
acceptable approach in that it gives full recognition to the social
value of the occasion and it provides only for that amount of restraint
upon the activities of the agencies which will insure that the interest
of those reported on is not unduly neglected.
The liability of mercantile agencies for false credit reports is a
problem that has been brought before the courts quite often in recent
years. The large number of suits being brought by persons who have
been discredited dearly indicates that the danger of errors is a very
substantial one. The defense of truth, which is always available, is
very rarely relied upon. Unfortunately, the courts have continued to
follow precedents which have cloaked these agencies with such pro-
tection in the form of conditional privilege that the defense of truth
is in most cases unnecessary. The hesitancy to depart from the majori-
ty rule has resulted in an increasing array of cases to support it.
Perhaps the unwillingness of the courts to modify this rule is due to
some extent to a feeling that any aid to the plaintiff in these suits
should proceed from the legislature. Though this would be a method
of solution, from a practical standpoint it probably would never re-
sult. There is no organized group to stimulate the passage of such
legislation and to overcome the opposition that would naturally arise
from the agencies. In any event, it is fair to say that negligence on
the part of these establishments, though it is in fact short of the
degree which may tend to indicate a malevolent state of mind, is
nevertheless indicative of an unreasonable interference with the plain-
tiff's interest even when considered in view of the policy of the
privilege. If the courts should accept this as true, why should the
plaintiff's efforts to recover for this interference be stymied? An
attempt has been made to show that liability based on negligent con-
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duct is not necessarily repugnant to the rules which govern the
availability of the defense of conditional privilege. Hence, the problem
is not of such a nature that it must await statutory change. It has
been said that "the law of Torts is based on the principle that one
who harms another has a duty of compensation whenever it is just
that he should pay.' ' 74 It is the province of the courts to work within
this principle, and it would seem more clearly satisfied if mercantile
agencies were held to answer for their carelessness.
CHARiEs E. BAKER.
74. Seavey, COGIrATIONs ox Toits, p. 3 (1954).
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